











This article argues that Ursula Le Guin’s science fiction is a form of ‘speculative
anthropology’ that reconciles thick description and historicity. Like Clifford
Geertz’s ethnographic writings, Le Guin’s science fiction utilises thick description
to place the reader within unfamiliar social worlds rendered with extraordinary
phenomenological fluency. At the same time, by incorporating social antagonisms,
cultural contestation, and historical contingency, Le Guin never allows thick descrip-
tion to neutralise historicity. Rather, by combining the two and exploring their inter-
play, Le Guin establishes a critical relation between her imagined worlds and the
reader’s own historical moment. This enables her to both counter Fredric Jameson’s
influential criticism of her work – the charge of ‘world reduction’ – and point to
ungrasped utopian possibilities within the present. Le Guin’s speculative anthropol-
ogy thus combines the strengths while overcoming some of the limitations of both
Geertz’s thick-descriptive method and Jameson’s theory of the science fiction genre.
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Introduction
The intersection of science fiction studies with other areas of academic
enquiry has proven a fertile one in recent years. Scholarship of this kind
includes work on the relationship between science fiction and cultural
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studies (Milner, 2010), economics (Davies, 2018), sociology (Seeger and
Davison-Vecchione, 2019), and intellectual history (Bell, 2020).
Anthropologists have likewise shown interest in science fiction. In
2018, the Society for Cultural Anthropology commissioned a blog
series on the theme of speculative anthropologies (Anderson et al.,
2018). These intriguing suggestions by scholars from across the huma-
nities and social sciences point to some of the many potential resonances
between science fiction and the discipline of anthropology. Developing
these ideas, Matthew Wolf-Meyer has authored a short monograph on
anthropology and speculative fiction, drawing on a range of science fic-
tion literature and film (Wolf-Meyer, 2019). Wolf-Meyer’s contention is
that insisting on a sharp distinction between social theory and speculative
fiction misrepresents and downplays the speculative nature of knowledge
claims in the social sciences (2019: 6). Wolf-Meyer also draws attention
to their shared focus: as he observes, ‘the questions anthropologists,
sociologists, and psychologists have been pursuing since the nineteenth
century have also been motivating speculative fiction writers, from Mary
Shelley, Jules Verne, and H.G. Wells, to our contemporaries’ (2019: 5).
As this rollcall of authors indicates, comparisons between the social sci-
ences and the science fiction genre, as a subset of speculative fiction, are
highly promising. Such comparisons allow anthropology to build on the
‘literary turn’ it took in the 1980s and 1990s, when scholars like James
Clifford and George Marcus (1986) brought techniques associated with
literary fiction to bear on anthropological writing. One major science
fiction author conspicuously absent from Wolf-Meyer’s study is Ursula
Le Guin, a writer whose work clearly exhibits anthropological influences
and, the present article shall argue, itself merits consideration as a form
of ‘speculative anthropology’.
It is no surprise that Le Guin’s work should be influenced by anthro-
pology.1 Le Guin’s mother, Theodora Kroeber, pursued graduate studies
in anthropology, participated in an archaeological dig in Peru’s Nazca
Valley, co-authored a journal article on methodologies in cultural
anthropology (Clements, Schenck, and Brown, 1926), published a collec-
tion of retellings of California Native American legends in 1959
(Kroeber, 2005), and later married the anthropologist Alfred Louis
(A.L.) Kroeber, one of the most influential American cultural anthro-
pologists of the first half of the 20th century. After Alfred received his
PhD in anthropology from Columbia University in 1901, where his thesis
was supervised by Franz Boas, he went on to become Professor of
Anthropology at the University of California, Berkeley, where he
taught until his retirement. As well as forging personal ties with a
number of Native Americans in the Napa Valley area, Alfred was the
author of the Handbook of the Indians of California, a major 1925 study
of the demographics, languages, social structures, folkways, religion, and
material culture of the principal Native American tribes of California
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(Kroeber, 1979). He also worked closely with Ishi, the last known
member of the Yahi people, of whom Theodora subsequently wrote an
acclaimed biography, Ishi in Two Worlds, published in 1961 (Kroeber,
2002). The influence of her parents’ involvement with anthropology on
Le Guin’s upbringing, education, and intellectual development was
therefore profound.
As a way into the following discussion of Le Guin’s speculative
anthropology, and in order to motivate the questions that we pursue
throughout it, it is instructive to consider an influential critique of Le
Guin’s work put forward by Fredric Jameson in his essay ‘World
Reduction in Le Guin’. The core of Jameson’s criticism is that in her
major science fiction novels Le Guin is engaged in thought experiments
which involve a drastic simplification of human life as we know it. These
involve, Jameson claims, a ‘surgical excision of empirical reality, some-
thing like a process of ontological attenuation in which the sheer teeming
multiplicity of what exists, of what we call reality, is deliberately thinned
and weeded out through an operation of radical abstraction and simpli-
fication which I will henceforth term world reduction’ (Jameson, 2005c:
271). In the case of The Left Hand of Darkness, Jameson sees the depic-
tion of the inhabitants of the planet Gethen, on which the novel is set, as
an attempt to strip away many of the features and historical traces which
constitute present-day humanity, so as to be left with an ‘essential’
human nature – something that Jameson, as a thoroughgoing historicist,
is committed to rejecting (2005c: 269). Jameson also voices reservations
about the novel’s ostensibly radical gender politics. The Left Hand of
Darkness is concerned with a race of ambisexual beings, the
Gethenians, who spend most of their lives in an androgynous state,
only becoming male or female for a few days each month during a sexu-
ally active period known as ‘kemmer’. Whereas commentators on the
novel have tended to focus on the nature of the Gethenians themselves,
Jameson shifts the focus to the text’s political unconscious. What Le
Guin’s novel tries to repress is, according to Jameson, conflicting
human desires and hence historical conflict, which ‘admits of no
[merely fictional] ‘‘solution’’’ (Jameson, 2005c: 274). In effect, the fic-
tional device of kemmer short-circuits political conflict around gender
by inventing a world in which such conflict can never arise. This criticism
is followed by an analogous criticism levelled at Le Guin’s slightly later
work, The Dispossessed.
The Dispossessed focuses on the relationship between two neighbour-
ing worlds, Anarres and Urras, the former of which is organised along
anarcho-syndicalist lines, while the latter features a patriarchal capitalist
society with obvious parallels to 20th-century America. Regarding the
novel’s attempt to think beyond capitalism in the case of Anarres,
Jameson identifies similar limitations to those he finds in The Left
Hand of Darkness: in order to describe a liberated society, Le Guin is
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forced to imagine humanity ‘released from the multiple determinisms
(economic, political, social) of history itself’ (Jameson, 2005c: 275).
Jameson’s criticism of the later novel’s world reduction thus parallels
that of the earlier: ‘this attempt to rethink Western history without cap-
italism is of a piece, structurally and in its general spirit, with the attempt
to imagine human biology without desire’ (Jameson, 2005c: 277).
Jameson’s readings are, then, examples of ideology critique: both
novels are read as trying to resolve social antagonisms in the form of
fantasy, thereby proffering imaginary solutions to real problems. There is
a case to be made, however, that Jameson’s readings neglect much of the
richness and specificity of Le Guin’s science fiction, in the process fore-
closing its anthropological aspect as well as its utopian potential. In
order to recover this potential, a different approach is required, one
capable of doing justice to the complex worldbuilding that is character-
istic of Le Guin’s fiction. As we shall see, attending to the interplay of
thick description and historicity in Le Guin’s work reveals the outline of
an implicit theory of speculative anthropology that facilitates exploration
of the relationship between anthropology and science fiction. In effect,
Le Guin uses science fiction to combine the strengths – and partly over-
come the limitations – of Geertzian thick description and Jamesonian
historicist formalism as approaches to analysing symbolic practices.
Clifford Geertz and Thick Description
In his own words, Clifford Geertz sets out to demonstrate that anthro-
pology is ‘not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive
one in search of meaning’ (Geertz, 2017f: 5).2 Central to this interpretive
anthropology is the concept of ‘thick description’, which Geertz adapts
from the philosopher Gilbert Ryle (1971b; 1971c). By this, Geertz means
an attempt to reconstruct the symbolic meaning that human actors
ascribe to their activity within a defined cultural context. Geertz is
highly sensitive to the complex, superimposed, interpenetrating concep-
tual structures that the ethnographer has the difficult task of grasping
and then rendering discursively (Geertz, 2017f: 11). He acknowledges the
dilemma of how the anthropologist is expected ‘to sound like a pilgrim
and a cartographer at the same time’, that is, to simultaneously convey
intimate immersion in the cultural worlds they visit and keep a cool
distance from those worlds (Geertz, 1988: 10). Geertz criticises ideational
understandings of culture, preferring instead to conceptualise culture as
both socially constituted and socially constituting, and to concentrate on
symbols that hold and convey meanings for the social actors who have
produced them. In doing so, he puts forward a view of anthropology that
brings together finely detailed ethnography, a broadly hermeneutic
approach to the interpretation of cultural texts, and a striking literary
sensibility. Geertz likewise explicitly calls on anthropologists to develop a
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‘scientific phenomenology of culture’ (2017b: 389). Phenomenological
approaches to qualitative social science aim to understand human
action via the actor’s own frames of reference, focusing on the actor’s
embodied and intersubjective engagements with their world, as well as
the organised ‘stocks’ of taken-for-granted knowledge on which their
everyday activities draw. However, in explicit contrast to philosophical
phenomenologists, Geertz stresses the symbolically mediated relation
between actor and situation. Geertz looks at how social actors engage
in (inter)subjectively meaningful activities within a ‘self-evident’ world
of everyday life, but sees this world, crucially, as ‘a cultural prod-
uct . . . framed in terms of the symbolic conceptions of ‘‘stubborn fact’’
handed down from generation to generation’ (2017c: 119).
Arguably the most well-known of Geertz’s ethnographies to employ
thick description is ‘Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight’.
In almost cinematic style, Geertz describes being taken to one of the
many popular, but illegal, cockfights in a Balinese village in 1958
and then fleeing from the police when they arrive to break up the gather-
ing. The account he offers vividly renders the event such that the
reader feels something of what it is like to ‘be there’ and analyses the
experience through the layers of meaning the participants ascribe to
the event. In doing so, the ethnography not only relates what happened,
but helps the reader to see it as a symbolically laden activity. Geertz
interprets the cockfight as a ritual that is ‘fundamentally a dramatization
of status concerns’ (2017a: 459). Rather than the monetary bets as
such, the depth of Balinese cockfighting as a kind of play comes
from ‘the migration of the Balinese status hierarchy into the body of
the cockfight’ (Geertz, 2017a: 457). Drawing partly on the literary
critic Northrop Frye’s account of literature as a form of socially consti-
tutive meaning-making, Geertz then reaches the following extensive
conclusions:
What the cockfight says it says in a vocabulary of sentiment – the
thrill of risk, the despair of loss, the pleasure of triumph. Yet what it
says is not merely that risk is exciting, loss depressing, or triumph
gratifying, banal tautologies of affect, but that it is of these emo-
tions, thus exampled, that society is built and individuals put
together. Attending cockfights and participating in them is, for
the Balinese, a kind of sentimental education. What he learns
there is what his culture’s ethos and his private sensibility (or,
anyway, certain aspects of them) look like when spelled out exter-
nally in a collective text; that the two are near enough alike to be
articulated in the symbolics of a single such text; and – the disquiet-
ing part – that the text in which this revelation is accomplished
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consists of a chicken hacking another mindlessly to bits. (Geertz,
2017a: 471)
Geertz sees ‘the more profound corollary’ of his research as the insight
that ‘cultural forms can be treated as texts, as imaginative works built out
of social materials’ (2017a: 470).
Influential and compelling as it may be, Geertz’s approach is open to
several criticisms. To begin with, viewing ritualistic events as symbolic
reflections of social structure that affirm a society’s core values neglects
inquiry into the process of symbolisation itself, including the partici-
pants’ contestation of how status relationships are symbolised and
centred (Bronner, 2005). Leo Howe argues that, by ignoring the mech-
anics of power and confusing ‘the local idiom of power’ with its material
basis, Geertz risks making societies such as Bali appear more ‘other’ than
warranted (Howe, 1991: 451). Howe demonstrates this with ethnographic
evidence of how pervasive hierarchy is in Bali, how Balinese social rela-
tions become encoded in hierarchically informed ideas, and how these
ideas historically become formative presuppositions of Balinese life
(1991: 453).
Geertz likewise at times fails to appreciate the specifically political
dimension of cultural change and the ways in which social and political
conflict affects culture. In the case of the Balinese cockfight, one can
reasonably assume that the prohibition of such ceremonies and their
interruption by the Javanese police involve political confrontations,
which the Balinese interpret in explicitly political terms (Peletz, 1993).
When Geertz does turn his attention to the relationship between national
politics and culture, he expressly aims to develop ‘an understanding of
how it is that every people gets the politics it imagines’ (Geertz, 2017e:
335). This is somewhat unsatisfactory because it ignores how some
groups pay a price for imagining something different, as well as how
groups differ in how much they gain from politics (Waters, 1980). As
Mitchell Duneier points out, in his account of the cockfight, Geertz kept
no records of the family members’ bets or conversation, yet treated class
distinctions as largely irrelevant to how the event is perceived, claiming
that family members always root for cocks that belong to their own
family leaders (Duneier, 2011: 7–8). How might the account have differed
had we heard from Balinese witnesses themselves, especially those from
subordinate classes?
William Roseberry likewise argues that Geertz neglects key aspects of
Balinese society, such as the context of state formation and colonialism,
because of his insistence on seeing culture as a text, which separates it
from its material process of creation, as well as the larger historical pro-
cess that shapes it and that it shapes in turn (Roseberry, 1982: 1022).
Although William Sewell Jr. appreciates the force of Roseberry’s criti-
cism, he sees the issue as more one of synchrony versus diachrony rather
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than idealism versus materialism: ‘By treating a cultural performance as a
text . . . one fixes it and subjects it to a synchronic gaze, bracketing the
question of the processes that produced it in order to work out its inter-
nal logic’ (Sewell, 1997: 36–7). Although Geertz specifies the synchronic
coherence underlying the cultural practices he examines, this analysis
does not usually circle back to a diachronic view of the social tensions
or contingent historical circumstances that produced the cultural per-
formance in question (Sewell, 1997: 37).
In summary, the strength of Geertz’s interpretive anthropology is its
ability to capture the rich texture of human activity and its place in a web
of cultural meaning; its weakness is its insufficient sensitivity to perspec-
tival differences within a given culture (including those arising from
social and political conflict), and to the macro-historical context in
which cultures are situated. This is not to say that Geertz never addresses
conflict or history. When Geertz does consider these, however, it comes
at the price of disrupting the phenomenological continuity of his thick
description.
Thick Description in Le Guin
Like Geertz, Le Guin uses thick description for the purpose of making
sense of the practices of societies which differ radically from the obser-
ver’s (author’s or reader’s) own. In Geertz’s case, the societies under
consideration are those of real-world human groups studied by social
scientists. In the case of Le Guin’s speculative anthropology, these are
fictional societies typically seen from the perspective of an outsider figure
who plays the role of ersatz anthropologist. Le Guin states that she chose
to write The Dispossessed as a novel rather than, for instance, an essay
because this allowed the story to have
. . . the inherent self-contradictions of novelistic narrative that pre-
vent simplistic, single-theme interpretation, the novelistic ‘thickness
of description’ (Geertz’s term) that resists reduction to abstracts and
binaries, the embodiment of ethical dilemma in a drama of charac-
ter that evades allegorical interpretation, the presence of symbolic
elements that are not fully accessible to rational thought. (Le Guin,
2005: 306)
A comparable ‘thickness of description’ can be found at work in some of
Le Guin’s other science fiction novels.
While not formally an anthropologist, the protagonist of The Left
Hand of Darkness, Genly Ai, plays the role of participant-observer in
an alien culture, gradually deciphering the meaning of its inhabitants’
practices over the course of several years. During Ai’s time on Gethen/
Winter, he often struggles to interpret the opaque codes and behaviours
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of those he encounters. At the root of these difficulties lies the
Gethenians’ gender system, which Le Guin shows has ramifications for
every aspect of their lives. The following reflections by Ai on his early
encounters with Estraven, a senior Gethenian politician, provide insight
into the nature of the challenges this system presents him with:
Though I had been nearly two years on Winter I was still far from
being able to see the people of the planet through their own eyes.
I tried to, but my efforts took the form of self-consciously seeing a
Gethenian first as a man, then as a woman, forcing him into those
categories so irrelevant to his nature and so essential to my own.
Thus as I sipped my smoking sour beer I thought that at table
Estraven’s performance had been womanly, all charm and tact
and lack of substance, specious and adroit. Was it in fact perhaps
this soft supple femininity that I disliked and distrusted in him? For
it was impossible to think of him as a woman, that dark, ironic,
powerful presence near me in the firelit darkness, and yet whenever
I thought of him as a man I felt a sense of falseness, of imposture: in
him, or in my own attitude towards him? (Le Guin, 2017b: 11–12).
This passage conveys a sense of the adjustments, readjustments, and re-
readjustments that Ai finds he must make in order to comprehend his
interlocutor. It is sustained partly by a tension – sometimes implicit,
sometimes explicit – between Ai’s binary, patriarchal understanding of
gender and the gender system he finds among the Gethenians. The self-
interrogative, self-reflexive mode of the passage enacts Ai’s rapid changes
of mind and the sudden, gestalt-shift-like changes in perspective he
undergoes. The cumulative effect of the passage is a deepening turn
against the very categories in which it is couched. At first, Ai reflects,
he had viewed the typical Gethenian ‘first as a man, then as a woman’,
before becoming aware of the insufficiency of this way of seeing, at least
in part due to the degree of self-conscious effort required to do so.
Another attempt to make sense of gender on Gethen involves projecting
onto Estraven qualities Ai associates with femininity – ‘charm and tact
and lack of substance’ – in an attempt to stabilise the apparent flux which
confronts him. This leads Ai to a question: is it these specifically ‘femin-
ine’ characteristics in the ‘man’ before him that he finds himself reacting
against? But this possibility is then reframed and subtly undercut by the
final sentence. Its opening clause (‘For it was impossible to think of him
as a woman’) increases our awareness of the ambiguity of the term ‘fem-
inine’ in the context of Ai’s train of thought. Ai rules out the option of
seeing Estraven as a woman because of the latter’s ‘dark, ironic, powerful
presence’, which inclines Ai to view him, in line with his own socially
instilled expectations, as a man. This latter possibility is negated in turn,
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however, by the ‘sense of falseness, of imposture’ that comes over Ai
whenever he tries to see Estraven exclusively in this way. Had Le Guin
ended the sentence at this point with a full stop, Ai’s thought would have
culminated in an uncertainty about how to define Estraven’s gender.
Instead, Le Guin introduces an unexpected colon, and the words that
follow it raise Ai’s reflections to a higher level of self-consciousness. The
question he is left with is not simply that of why he feels a sense of
falseness in regarding Estraven as either a man or a woman but, crucially,
of whether his familiar gender categories are themselves the source of that
sense of falseness. The falseness has, we might say, begun to migrate from
the ‘anomalous’ Estraven to the gender conventions Ai adheres to,
thereby bringing about a crisis in the latter.
The question Ai raises in the last sentence is left unanswered, at least at
this early point in the novel, but in raising it in this way and in exploring
its contours in the involved, self-interrogative manner of this passage, Le
Guin is able to interpolate the reader in a very direct way into the experi-
ence undergone by a participant-observer coming to know an unfamiliar
culture. It is noteworthy here that, before coming to Gethen, Ai was fully
aware of the gender system on the planet, yet still finds it hard to adjust
to once he arrives. This contrast between Ai’s bare knowledge of that
system and his actual encounter with it serves as a fictional exemplifica-
tion of the difference between thin and thick description: the information
he has been furnished with prior to his visit is a long way from his lived
experience on Gethen as rendered by Le Guin via her fictional analogue
of a Geertzian thick-descriptive field report.
Thick description is put to many uses by Le Guin, however, beyond
providing a sense of the epistemological crises which fieldwork can
induce in the participant-observer. In the case of The Dispossessed,
thick description is used to provide, if anything, an even more complete
picture of an alien society’s norms and practices. The protagonist of the
novel, Shevek, is a physicist from the anarcho-syndicalist world of
Anarres. Like Ai, Shevek does not have a background in anthropology,
yet his open-mindedness and intellectual curiosity mean he approaches
life on Urras, the planet where much of the action is set, with all the
attentiveness and inquisitiveness of a dedicated ethnographer. The patri-
archal capitalist Urrasian state of A-Io is a society whose values and
priorities are at first deeply puzzling to Shevek. In one early Urrasian
encounter, Shevek reflects that, ‘this curious matter of superiority, of
relative height, was important to the Urrasti; they often used the word
‘‘higher’’ as a synonym for ‘‘better’’ in their writings, where an Anarresti
would use ‘‘more central’’ [...] It was one puzzle among hundreds’ (Le
Guin, 1999: 16). Given that Urras is clearly modelled on contemporary
US society, the effect of such passages is to estrange the reader from that
way of life, rendering it unfamiliar and questionable by aligning us with
Shevek’s perspective.
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The aspect of the novel which most closely approximates Geertzian
thick description, however, is Le Guin’s treatment of life on Anarres.
In these parts of the book, rather than viewing a familiar kind of
society through the eyes of an alien observer, we are viewing a decid-
edly unfamiliar kind of society – one where the concept of private
property is not just absent but almost inconceivable, for instance –
through the eyes of someone acculturated within it and able to take
its ways largely as given. By weaving the absence of patriarchy, private
property, social hierarchy, and law into her narrative in this way, Le
Guin forces the reader to work actively to construct plausible inter-
pretations of the evidence they receive of how such a society might
function. She does not, in other words, provide a comprehensive
aerial perspective on Anarres. Instead, the reader is left to construct
as coherent an account as they can of what they are given. Although we
are privy to some of the teachings of Odo, the founder of the dominant
political philosophy of Anarres, these are dense, decontextualised, and
occasionally incomplete fragments. What we are presented with,
rather, are suggestive accounts of everyday scenes on Anarres without,
as it were, an accompanying set of footnotes explaining the principles
which inform them.
The following passages succinctly illustrate some of the central values
of Shevek’s society:
. . . Sabul wanted to keep the new Urrasti physics private – to own it,
as a property, a source of power over his colleagues on Anarres. But
this idea was so counter to Shevek’s habits of thinking that it had
great difficulty getting itself clear in his mind, and when it did he
suppressed it at once, with contempt, as a genuinely disgusting
thought. (Le Guin, 1999: 93)
As a child, if you slept alone in a single it meant you had bothered
the others in the dormitory until they wouldn’t tolerate you; you
had egoised. Solitude equated with disgrace. (Le Guin, 1999: 93)
. . . sexual privacy was freely available and socially expected; and
beyond that privacy was not functional. It was excess, waste. The
economy of Anarres would not support the building, maintenance,
heating, lighting of individual houses and apartments. A person
whose nature was genuinely unsociable had to get away from soci-
ety and look after himself. He was completely free to do so . . .But
for those who accepted the privilege and obligation of human
solidarity, privacy was a value only where it served a function.
(Le Guin, 1999: 94)
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The dominant social value underlying the various practices alluded to in
these passages is what the Anarresti call, in a conscious echo on Le
Guin’s part of the anarchist tradition, ‘mutual aid’. Rather than
making this theory explicit, however, Le Guin instead emphasises the
ingrained responses of individuals to a range of everyday issues: express-
ing contempt in the face of the desire to privatise knowledge, equating
solitude with disgrace, and equating privacy with waste, for example.
The second passage employs the verb ‘egoise’, a term of Le Guin’s own
invention. This term is never defined, but it often appears in exchanges
between the Anarresti. On the simplest level, someone may be accused of
egoising if they act out of an inflated sense of self-importance. On a
second level, to egoise is to act in a way which denies or overrides the
sense of solidarity that is the foundation of the Anarresti way of life.
Thirdly, egoising has connotations of a mean, hoarding mentality, and is
associated with squandering resources, as in the case of the individual
who takes an unwarranted share of land for themselves. Fourthly, there
is what might be called an ‘ecological’ dimension to the condemnation of
egoising, since promoting one’s own power or advantage at the expense
of others damages an entire network of nested relationships and inter-
involvements. Finally, echoing Le Guin’s interest in the Chinese Taoist
tradition, there is a metaphysical dimension to egoising. Shevek remarks
that, ‘It’s the self that suffers, and there’s a place where the self – ceases’
(Le Guin, 1999: 53). Given this emphasis on the limits of the self, egoising
may be understood as resistance to the ultimate nature of things. It is also
therefore to fall into a kind of error: the person who egoises is acting on
the basis of their isolated self as opposed to acting out of a sense of the
whole of which they are a part. The term ‘egoising’ unites all these diverse
senses.
In Always Coming Home, published 11 years after The Dispossessed,
Le Guin’s speculative anthropology is at its most explicit and self-aware.
Although often billed as a novel, the book describes itself as ‘an archae-
ology of the future’ and takes the form of a compendious bricolage of
texts recovered from a society inhabited by the Kesh people of Northern
California in the distant future (Le Guin, 2016: 3). The book is composed
of scraps of narrative related in the first person, anthropological field
notes, poems, songs, folk tales, musical scores, diagrams, sketches of
artefacts, and even recipes. To a greater extent than either of the previous
texts, Always Coming Home requires sustained, active engagement on the
part of the reader in constructing a context for the people and practices it
depicts.
Around a third of the book is taken up by the story of Stone Telling, a
Kesh woman whose life illustrates some of the main elements of Kesh
society. Many of these texts are also framed by commentary from a
character named Pandora, an anthropologist from another society that
seems to inhabit a much later period than that of the Kesh. By presenting
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first-person narrative and commentary alongside each other, Le Guin
tasks the reader with following Pandora’s lead by working to make
sense of the symbolic structures of Kesh culture in a manner redolent
of Geertz’s study of the Balinese cockfight. As in that study, Le Guin’s
novel provides many instances of what a ‘culture’s ethos’ – in this case
the Kesh’s – ‘look[s] like when spelled out externally in a collective text’,
primarily in the form of a range of arts and crafts (Geertz, 2017a: 470).
Like the Gethenian gender system and the Anarresti prohibition on ego-
ising, the practices and values of the Kesh depart radically from those of
patriarchal capitalist society. Most notably, the Kesh do not experience a
gulf separating human from nonhuman. They see humanity as having no
particular privilege or centrality within nature, suggesting affinities with
deep ecology and setting up a contrast with a capitalist ethos of profit
and growth. Always Coming Home represents the most ambitious of Le
Guin’s exercises in speculative anthropology: an attempt to envision a
way of life in which the guiding assumptions and values of capitalist
modernity are wholly absent, yet in which modern concerns – about
the environment, alienation, and oppression – are addressed.
From these examples, we see how Le Guin’s affectively and symbol-
ically immersive encounters with imagined anthropological ‘others’
prompt self-reflection in both her characters and her readers. She thereby
utilises thick description to achieve reflexivity of the kind Michael
Taussig (2010: xiv) has in mind when he warns how, ‘[i]n trying to explain
the strange and the unknown, we must never lose sight of how truly
strange is our own reality’. Like the anthropologist Kathleen Stewart
(2007: 5), Le Guin writes ‘not as a trusted guide carefully laying out
the links between theoretical categories and the real world, but as a
point of impact, curiosity, and encounter’, depicting character inter-
actions in a way that understands how ethnographic subjects can
‘resist researchers’ efforts and interpretations, and add their own inter-
pretations and insights’ (Naples, 2003: 4). Like Kim Fortun (2001: 22) in
her ethnographic studies of real-world social actors, Le Guin presents
diverse, narratively mediated texts like folk tales and transcripts not
because they establish the finality of the offered account but ‘rather
because they harbor potential for ever further elaboration’. As we will
see, this resistance to closure is also key to Le Guin’s approach to
historicity.
Historicity in Le Guin
While employing thick description, Le Guin remains sensitive to histor-
icity, presenting the elements of her invented worlds – practices, institu-
tions, philosophies, religions, etc. – as having developed historically. This
lends these elements a vital sense of historical contingency, undercutting
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any impression that they are immutable or simply given, however they
may be understood by those who inhabit these worlds.
In The Left Hand of Darkness, Le Guin uses changes in viewpoint to
suggest possible long-term explanations for present social conditions.
For instance, an investigator who was part of the first landing party
on Gethen hypothesises that the sparse population and harsh climate
are major reasons for the absence of war (Le Guin, 2017a: 96). In the
story’s present, however, Ai points to a number of more recent develop-
ments that might bring an end to this long-standing state of affairs,
including the rise of patriotism, the nation-state, and economic prestige
competition (Le Guin, 2017a: 49). Elsewhere, Ai considers the compara-
tively slow rate of technological progress on Gethen, which seems to have
developed ‘without any industrial revolution, without any revolution at
all’ (Le Guin, 2017a: 98). Ai attributes this gradual pace to caution in the
face of the unforgiving environment, but underscores that, despite
appearances, technological progress on Gethen has never ceased: both
‘the torrent and the glacier... get where they are going’ (Le Guin, 2017a:
98). The effect of all this is to place the society that Ai observes within a
much larger set of historical processes, thereby helping to explain why
Gethen exists in its current state and how certain developments, such as
the recent increase in competition between Gethenian polities for eco-
nomic and other forms of prestige, might be creating the conditions for
further and more drastic change. In these and related ways, Le Guin
ensures that her speculative anthropology articulates both a synchronic
account of webs of human meaning-making and a diachronic account of
the modification of those webs over time.
Historicity is perhaps even more central to The Dispossessed. A major
historical event that informs much of the novel is a failed revolution on
Urras that occurred two centuries before the novel takes place, which Le
Guin explores elsewhere in her 1974 short story ‘The Day before the
Revolution’ (Le Guin, 2017b). After their attempted revolution was fore-
stalled, the Odonians agreed to leave Urras and settle on the harsher,
scarcer world of Anarres. The novel conveys the extent of the changes
undergone by the Odonian community by illustrating how aspects of
their pre-revolutionary past that were taken for granted at the time
have now become alien to them. An Odonian called Tirin shows a
more critical awareness of history when discussing archival film footage
of Urras in a class on the history of the Odonian movement:
If those pictures are a hundred and fifty years ago, things could be
entirely different now on Urras. I don’t say they are, but if they were
how would we know it? We don’t go there, we don’t talk, there’s no
communication. We really have no idea what life’s like on Urras
now. (Le Guin, 1999: 38)
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This illustrates not only consciousness of the possibility of radical social
change across historical eras but also of how historical memory of the
failed revolution and the subsequent development of Odonian society can
be leveraged as a source of political criticism of that very society. The
Odonians, Tirin suggests, have allowed themselves to become isolated on
Anarres, not only in the sense that they agreed to their initial exile but
also in terms of their failure to stay in communication with the
Urrasians, thereby undermining one of their philosophy’s own revolu-
tionary tenets. Consequently, Odonian culture has begun to ossify and
lose its vitality. As another Odonian, Bedap, laments, ‘Kids learn
to parrot Odo’s words as if they were laws – the ultimate blasphemy!’
(Le Guin, 1999: 140).
On Urras, on the other hand, the Ioti use museums to preserve their
ancient cultural memory, including its most graphically and sadistically
violent episodes:
Shevek and Vea came to a glass case in which lay the cloak of Queen
Teaea, made of the tanned skins of rebels flayed alive, which that
terrible and defiant woman had worn when she went among her
plague-stricken people to pray God to end pestilence, fourteen hun-
dred years ago. [. . .] ‘Why do you people cling to your shame?’
[Shevek] said. ‘But it’s all just history! Things like that couldn’t
happen now!’ [replied Vea.] (Le Guin, 1999: 180)
This passage illustrates how the Ioti ruling classes nostalgically look
upon their society’s past, with the displayed cloak serving as a symbol
of power and authority in the face of challenges to the status quo. While
Vea’s response to Shevek’s horrified question indicates that she does not
view the exhibit as an ideological statement, immediately before this she
flippantly remarks that the cloak ‘looks awfully like goatskin’ (Le Guin,
1999: 180), suggesting a lack of sympathy for the slaughtered rebels and
reflecting how the Ioti have been taught to understand their violent past
(and, it is implied, their present). This recalls Geertz’s remark that culture
imposes meaning on experience through ‘symbolic conceptions of ‘‘stub-
born fact’’ handed down from generation to generation’, which frame the
‘world of everyday life’ (Geertz, 2017c: 119). The scene’s dialogic quality
calls the Ioti’s settled view of the past into question, however, by viewing
the same artefact from an alien (Shevek’s) perspective. In terms of the
hermeneutic phenomenology that informs Geertz’s thick description,
Shevek disturbs the Ioti’s taken-for-granted knowledge of their everyday
world by drawing attention to a significant symbolic object within that
world and viewing it through a different cultural frame. As with other
scenes set on Urras, the reader is made conscious of how ideas of hier-
archy which are alien to Shevek have historically become formative pre-
suppositions of everyday life on Urras, thereby integrating thick
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description and historicity in a way that avoids a noted weakness of
Geertz’s own approach. Relatedly, whereas Geertz’s account of the cock-
fight and its breakup has been criticised for its lack of interest in how
subordinate class participants viewed the event and how all those present
understood the confrontation with law enforcement politically,
Le Guin’s account of the Ioti general strike and its breakup foregrounds
both of these elements and places them in a macro-historical perspective.
Uniting the Anarresti and Urrasian strands of the novel, the episode of
the general strike – viewed from the immersed perspective of a partici-
pant-observer who becomes more a participant than an observer –
implies that the history of Urras could conceivably have been radically
different had the Odonians not cut themselves off from those who might
have supported their cause.
In Always Coming Home, meanwhile, historicity is elevated to a meta-
textual principle through the book’s framing as an ethnographic account
of a future people. In her narration, Pandora expresses self-reflexive con-
cerns about how she is conducting her study of the Kesh. Early in the
book, she draws attention to the incomplete pattern she is assembling,
illustrating this through the metaphor of a broken clay bowl (Le Guin,
2016: 53). This would seem to be a commentary on the task of the eth-
nographer and the problem of representation, since Pandora’s object of
study, an entire way of life, is by its nature incomplete and open-ended,
yet she is conscious of the presumed authoritativeness that comes from
couching her account in social-scientific terms. Pandora is wary of pre-
senting Kesh culture as static or fixed – the danger of prioritising syn-
chrony over diachrony that we saw in the case of Geertz.
In this respect, it is worth considering the Kesh’s distinctive under-
standing of their position in time and space. Two key elements here are
the ‘City of Mind’ and the ‘City of Man’ (Le Guin, 2016: 149–72). The
City of Mind is a network of intercommunicating sites ‘occupied by
independent, self-contained, and self-regulating communities of cyber-
netic devices or beings’ (Le Guin, 2016: 149).3 The City of Man, on
the other hand, is how the ‘period in which we live, our civilisation,
Civilisation as we know it, appeared in the Valley [Kesh] thought’, that
is, ‘as a remote region, set apart from the community and continuity of
human/animal/earthly existence – a sort of peninsula sticking out from
the mainland, very thickly built upon, very heavily populated, very
obscure, and very far away’ (Le Guin, 2016: 153). Pandora elaborates:
‘the City of Mind, the computer network, including the Exchanges, was
referred to as being ‘‘outside the world’’ – existing in the same time-
region or mode as the City of Man, civilisation. The relation between
the City and the Valley is not clear’ (Le Guin, 2016: 153). Pandora pur-
sues this point in her consideration of the story of a Kesh man who
journeys to the United States in the late 20th century, where he is horri-
fied by the pollution, war, and inequality, and eventually dies ‘of grief
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and poison’ (Le Guin, 2016: 157). This is followed by the story of ‘Big
Man and Little Man’, which takes the form of a creation myth and tells
of the backward-headed ‘Little Man’ (implicitly modern humanity) kill-
ing and poisoning everything in the world and eventually dying of fear
(Le Guin, 2016: 157–9). Pandora’s following editorial, which makes
explicit the post-apocalyptic framing of the novel, clarifies that the
Backward-Heads populate Kesh ghost stories because the Valley is still
marked by ‘the permanent desolation of vast regions through release of
radioactive or poisonous substances, the permanent genetic impairment
from which [the Kesh] suffered most directly in the form of sterility,
stillbirth, and congenital disease’ (Le Guin, 2016: 159). Le Guin’s own
society is thus woven into Kesh lore and superstition via the evidence left
from that era’s destructive activity. This serves to underscore the extent
to which a past moment of historical rupture – namely, the anthropo-
genic processes that culminated in ecological destruction and the collapse
of industrialised society – pervades the present reality of the Kesh in
terms of both cultural memory and physical geography. As in the previ-
ous two novels, this juxtaposition of familiar and unfamiliar transforms
capitalist modernity into the ‘other’ of the society depicted – to the extent
that even the wholly artificial City of Mind is seen by the Kesh as belong-
ing to an earlier ‘time-region’ rather than their own, despite the City’s
acknowledged existence within their own moment. In this way, both the
world inhabited by the characters and the world inhabited by the reader
are historicised and seen in relation to one another. By establishing this
diachronic relation and setting her imagined worlds in motion, Le Guin
reflexively brings questions of power, voice, translation, and memory
into sharper relief and complicates traditional ethnographic binaries
like insider/outsider and observer/observed.
Le Guin’s Speculative Anthropology
Jameson’s ‘World Reduction in Le Guin’ and Geertz’s ‘Notes on the
Balinese Cockfight’ represent two strongly contrasting ways of approach-
ing the analysis of cultural texts: a ‘transcendent’ approach that abstracts
away from content and resituates the text within the historical totality of
literary forms, and an ‘immanent’ approach that focuses almost solely on
content and brackets the text’s wider historical frame. In the face of the
apparent irreconcilability of these approaches, Le Guin’s synthesis of
historicity and thick description in a science-fictional context takes on
a new significance.
Allowing for the important difference that Geertz is concerned with
empirically existing societies while Le Guin is concerned with invented
ones (a point to which we shall return), both writers can be seen to
employ a range of literary techniques to disclose the phenomenological
texture of unfamiliar ways of life. ‘Description’ scarcely does justice to
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the richness of this way of bringing experience to words. Beyond simply
‘describing’ character, action, and setting, Le Guin inhabits language
in such a way as to be able to initiate the reader, both cognitively
and affectively, into alternate ways of being. To this extent, Le Guin
and Geertz are engaged in strikingly complementary enterprises.
Unlike Geertz, however, Le Guin never allows thick description to neu-
tralise historicity. She avoids this by incorporating social antagonism,
cultural contestation, and historical contingency directly into her thick
descriptions. The ‘thickness’ of experience as rendered in Le Guin’s
novels is never seamless, and does not lead to a neglect of the conflicted,
unstable, and ambiguous elements of the societies portrayed.
Another dimension to the historicity of these novels, one with a bear-
ing on their status as science fiction, is its critical relation to the present.
The imaginative challenge posed to capitalism, imperialism, individual-
ism, ecological irresponsibility, patriarchy, and the gender binary in the
three novels we have been discussing is considerable. This challenge is
made possible by their resituating of familiar social and political realities
within a speculative frame which is nevertheless continuous with the
world of the reader. To return to the issue of fiction versus reality
raised above, the fact that Le Guin is describing invented societies as
opposed to real ones starts to become less important at this point. A large
and complex society built around the principle of mutual aid may not as
a matter of fact exist, yet The Dispossessed manages not just to power-
fully rearticulate ideas of the sort found in anarchists like Kropotkin but
also to give the reader some sense of what a radical, non-egoic solidarity
might be like in practice. Bracketing the fact that the novel takes place on
two alien worlds, what Carl Freedman has called science fiction’s ‘cog-
nitive continuum with the actual’ (Freedman, 2017: 232) can be seen in
the fact that the rival systems of government depicted are variations on
real-world forms of politics. In addition to the interaction of historical
elements within Le Guin’s invented worlds, then, we need to distinguish a
second mode of historicity whereby they stand in a critical relationship
not only to Le Guin’s (and our own) present but to unrealised possibi-
lities within that present. To this extent, Le Guin’s work steps outside the
parameters of Jameson’s own theory of science fiction. On the one hand,
in imagining the ‘future’ she is indirectly imagining the present, as
Jameson would want to say (Jameson, 2005b: 288). At the same time,
the anthropological component of her writing means the scenarios she
projects are not merely, in Jameson’s words, ‘mock futures’ (2005b: 288)
but rather occupy a zone somewhere between present and future: a kind
of exploratory anticipation.
Inevitably, separating out the thick-descriptive, historicist, and
science-fictional aspects of Le Guin’s work for analytical purposes is a
somewhat artificial enterprise. In reality, these are virtually inseparable,
and it is arguably on account of this fully integrated quality that her
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speculative anthropology possesses a utopian dimension unavailable to
Geertz. While Geertz clearly rejects primitivism, exoticism, or the ideal-
isation of traditional societies, he nevertheless holds that modern cultures
may be able to learn from the ways of life that are the focus of anthropo-
logical research (Geertz, 2000a: 68–88). Le Guin’s own borrowings from
such studies, most notably in Always Coming Home, which draws on
fieldwork on Native American cultures, suggests she shares this view.
There is an obvious limitation to the potential of such a learning process,
however, to which Le Guin, as a novelist, is not subject. This is that the
anthropologist as an empirical social scientist is constrained to represent
as accurately as possible the actual societies with which they are con-
fronted. This otherwise obvious point is worth making as it highlights the
importance of combining anthropological knowledge and methodology
with science-fictional worldbuilding. What Le Guin has in common with
Geertz is an ability to place the reader within a fully realised yet unfamil-
iar social world. By employing the science fiction genre, however, with its
simultaneous relation of difference and sameness to the present, and its
unique way of granting a historical perspective on that present, Le Guin
initiates a utopian mode of anthropology concerned as much with life as
it might be as with life as it is. The nonbinary gender system of the
Gethenians, the non-egoic solidarity of the Anarresti, and the ecological
attunement of the Kesh are all examples of science-fictional devices
which, although radically utopian in one sense, nevertheless display
clear links to real historical developments, including feminism, queer
politics, socialism, anarchism, and environmental activism. The phenom-
enological fluency with which these practices are rendered helps the
reader to relate them back to their own experience and to recognise
that, contra Jameson’s charge of world reduction, none of them requires
a leap outside the process of history altogether. If anything, Le Guin
illustrates how science fiction as a genre allows thick description and
historicity to become mutually enabling rather than mutually exclusive.
In mapping the relationship between historicity, thick description, and
science fiction in Le Guin, we have identified the core of her implicit
theory of anthropology. One might nevertheless wish to ask what value
such speculative anthropology is supposed to have for anthropologists
themselves. What exactly is to be gained by anthropological engagement
with science fiction? After all, a ‘speculative’ reconstruction of a trad-
itional way of life on the part of an anthropologist in the field would just
be bad anthropology, however imaginative it might be. An initial answer
is that, by illustrating how society could be organised differently, science
fiction is a valuable resource for thinking critically about the present by
denaturalising practices we take for granted and imagining counterfac-
tual lines of development. This is a promising approach to the genre for
social scientists because many of the phenomena examined in science
fiction (e.g. gender, class) are constitutive of real-world social relations
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and so are regarded as defining objects of study in several social-scientific
disciplines. A sceptic might respond, however, by arguing that instead of
engaging with Le Guin’s portrayal of, say, a nonbinary culture, anthro-
pologists could simply turn to the actual ethnographic record to find
examples of such cultures, especially as the ethnographic record provides
more secure empirical footing.
Part of the answer to this lies in how, when comparing extant cultures, it is
easy to think that a given culture developed as it did because of unique
economic, social, or geographical factors that cannot arise in the ethnog-
rapher’s own society. This makes it more difficult to conceive of such cultures
as representing possibilities ‘for us’ than imagined cultures that directly
extrapolate from observable processes in the ethnographer’s immediate con-
text. At the very least, it suggests that these two forms of intercultural com-
parison yield somewhat different critical orientations. Another part of the
answer lies in the fact that ethnography is a form of writing that not only
describes but also constructs its subject. This point was central to anthropol-
ogy’s literary turn, which looked back to the interest voiced by earlier anthro-
pologists in literary theory and practice (Craith and Fournier, 2016). As
James Clifford, a key figure in the literary turn, has observed, ‘Margaret
Mead, Edward Sapir, and Ruth Benedict saw themselves as both anthro-
pologists and literary artists’ (Clifford, 1986: 1). Meanwhile, in his key 1973
essay on thick description, Geertz states that ‘anthropological writings are
necessarily second and third order interpretations’ and ‘are thus, fictions;
fictions, in the sense that they are ‘‘something made’’, ‘‘something fash-
ioned’’’ (Geertz, 2017f: 17) – a point he subsequently expanded on
(Geertz, 1988). Anthropology is of course distinguishable from fiction for
many purposes, but, as the literary turn demonstrated, their shared emphasis
on the reconstruction and elaboration of diverse kinds of human experience
means that no straightforward separation between the two can be consist-
ently maintained. Conversely, as seen from our discussion of Le Guin’s
novels, ‘fictional’ need not mean ‘entirely invented’. As well as incorporating
real-world elements, Le Guin’s fiction dramatises the cognitive and affective
challenges of entering into and comprehending an unfamiliar way of life
without either (i) entirely reducing it to the reader’s local idiom, or (ii)
assuming that cultural differences make mutual understanding impossible.
A final component of speculative anthropology likely to prove of interest
to social scientists is its relationship to the future. Although we cannot fully
engage with them here, there have been various proposals for bringing
futurity centre-stage in anthropology. For example, in projecting an
‘anthropology of the future’, Rebecca Bryant and Daniel M. Knight
make the case for ‘a reorientation of the discipline from being to becoming,
from structure to agency, and from social institutions to the hope, plan-
ning, practices, and action that project those into the yet-to-come’ (Bryant
and Knight, 2019: 192–3). In response to these intimations, we shall close
with the suggestion that when we recognise Le Guin’s deployments of
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speculative anthropology as containing possibilities for us, a productive
dialogue between anthropology and science fiction studies may beckon.
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1. Le Guin has sometimes been considered part of a subgenre known as
‘anthropological science fiction’, encompassing Chad Oliver, Michael
Bishop, and Joanna Russ, among others (Collins, 2004). The term ‘specula-
tive anthropology’ as we use it here, however, refers to a specific combination
of thick description, historicity, and utopian anticipation. Whether it can be
applied to writers other than Le Guin would therefore have to be considered
on a case-by-case basis (see also Collins, 2005).
2. When Geertz was appointed at Harvard, he provided assistance on a research
project on the multiple meanings of the term ‘culture’ led by, among others,
A.L. Kroeber, ‘the then dean of the discipline’ (Geertz, 2000b: 12).
3. Le Guin elsewhere suggests the inspiration for the ‘City of Mind’ came partly
from her reading of Claude Lévi-Strauss’s lecture, ‘The Scope of
Anthropology’ (Le Guin, 2018b: 117).
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